A Model to Quantify the Success of a Sybil Attack Targeting RELOAD/Chord Resources by Urueña Pascual, Manuel et al.
© 2013 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from 
IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, 
including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or 
promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or 
redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of 
this work in other works. 
This document is published in:
IEEE Communications Letters, February 2013, 17(2), pp. 428 - 431. 
DOI: 10.1109/LCOMM.2013.011113.122220
A Model to Quantify the Success of a Sybil Attack
Targeting RELOAD/Chord Resources
Manuel Uruen˜a, Member, IEEE, Rube´n Cuevas, Member, IEEE, ´Angel Cuevas, Member, IEEE and Albert
Banchs Member, IEEE
Abstract—The Sybil attack is one of the most harmful security
threats for distributed hash tables (DHTs). This attack is not
only a theoretical one, but it has been spotted “in the wild”,
and even performed by researchers themselves to demonstrate
its feasibility. In this letter we analyse the Sybil attack whose
objective is that the targeted resource cannot be accessed by any
user of a Chord DHT, by replacing all the replica nodes that store
it with sybils. In particular, we propose a simple, yet complete
model that provides the number of random node-IDs that an
attacker would need to generate in order to succeed with certain
probability. Therefore, our model enables to quantify the cost of
performing a Sybil resource attack on RELOAD/Chord DHTs
more accurately than previous works, and thus establishes the
basis to measure the effectiveness of different solutions proposed
in the literature to prevent or mitigate Sybil attacks.
Index Terms—Chord, Distributed Hash Table (DHT), Kadem-
lia, P2PSIP, REsource LOcation And Discovery (RELOAD), Sybil
resource attack.
I. USING A SYBIL ATTACK AGAINST DHT RESOURCES
A distributed hash table (DHT) is a distributed system
designed to provide a simple and efficient storage and retrieval
of data/resources. In this letter, we use Chord [1] as its main
case of study since it is one of the most well-known DHTs, and
it has been chosen as the mandatory DHT algorithm for the
resource location and discovery (RELOAD) protocol [2] being
standardized by the IETF P2PSIP working group. However, it
must be noted that the model for the Sybil resource attack
defined in this letter is also applicable to other popular DHTs
such as Kademlia [3]. In Chord, the nodes participating in the
DHT form a ring-shaped overlay. The position of each node
in the ring is defined by its node-ID, which is the result of
applying a hash function to the node’s IP address and port,
thus having a random nature. Similarly, each resource has an
associated key that is obtained by applying the same hash
function to one or more properties of the resource (typically its
name). Due to resiliency reasons, each resource is replicated
and stored by the r successor nodes of the resource’s key.
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That is, the resource’s replicas are in the r nodes having the
subsequent IDs to the resource’s key in the Chord ring.
The Sybil attack [4] consists on obtaining multiple bogus
identities, called sybils, in order to perform different malicious
actions, such as degrading the routing performance of the
DHT, limiting the communications from/to one or more nodes,
or blocking the access to one (or more) resources. This paper
aims at developing a model that addresses the latter type of
Sybil attack, targeting all the replicas of a resource. Thus,
it does not consider any routing issues [5], including other
attacks targeting the DHT routing, such as the Eclipse attack
or Index Poisoning ones, which may also involve some kind
of Sybil attack. More importantly we assume that an attacker
cannot spoof or arbitrarily choose1 its node-IDs, but that they
are randomly assigned and verifiable. For instance by being
provided by a trusted entity (as proposed by RELOAD [2]) or
generated by some kind of verifiable cryptographic process
(as in Chord [1]). Otherwise, an attacker could pretend to
have the same node-ID as the targeted resource, as well as the
consecutive ones, and thus the described Sybil resource attack
would be quite easy to perform. Instead, we assume that the
attacker must obtain multiple random node-IDs until it gets r
successor IDs to the target resource’s key for its sybils. Then,
by controlling all its replicas, it is able to prevent the access
to that resource by any peer of the RELOAD/Chord DHT.
The Sybil attack is thus a real threat to DHT systems,
and not only from a theoretical point of view. Several re-
searchers [6], [7] have reported ongoing Sybil attacks in the
KAD network, and even performed it themselves for research
purposes. Therefore multiple works in the literature [8] have
proposed solutions to prevent or mitigate the harm produced
by Sybil attacks. This letter provides a detailed model of the
Sybil resource attack, and complements previous studies by
providing a simple and accurate way to compute the number
of node-IDs an attacker should obtain in order to perform a
successful Sybil attack. Therefore, our model is a useful tool
to validate the efficacy of the different solutions in practical
scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, few previous studies
[9]–[11] have tried to address this issue, but they just provide
an approximation to the real number of attempts, which greatly
overestimates its efficiency, as we will see later.
In short, the main contribution of this letter is the definition
1Actually, this is not the case in the KAD network because clients can
select their own identifiers. However, we believe that future versions of KAD
clients will avoid this behavior, since it represents a serious vulnerability. For
instance, version 0.49a of the eMule client has added some restrictions to
limit the number of node-IDs from the same subnet.
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of an analytical model that accurately specifies the number of
random node-IDs that an attacker has to obtain in order to
perform a Sybil resource attack with certain probability. This
model is useful to quantify the vulnerability of a particular
resource, as well as the whole DHT system. In particular, we
use our model to evaluate the vulnerability to Sybil resource
attacks of RELOAD/Chord systems, although it may be also
applicable to other popular DHT systems like Kademlia.
II. MODELLING THE NUMBER OF ATTEMPTS TO PERFORM
A SYBIL ATTACK AGAINST A SPECIFIC RESOURCE
Let us start focusing on the simplest case, in which the
target resource is stored in just one node (i.e. replica), that
is, r = 1. In this case the goal of the attacker is to place
one sybil between the target resource’s key and the ID of the
first successor node, which is storing the resource. We refer
to the portion of the ID-space between the resource’s key and
its first successor’s node-ID as the attack zone. Let us assume
that the number of identifiers forming the attack zone of a
given resource is z, from a total ID-space with M different
identifiers. Then the attacker should generate node-IDs until it
obtains one of the z identifiers within the attack zone. Since
IDs have a random nature, the probability of a randomly-
generated identifier belonging to the attack zone is p = zM .
Furthermore, the generation of a new ID is an independent
event. Therefore, the probability of succeeding in k or less
attempts is defined by the cumulative distribution function of
a geometric distribution:
Presource(z, k) = cdfresource
( z
M
, k
)
= 1−
(
1−
z
M
)k
(1)
In short, the previous equation defines the success proba-
bility of a Sybil attack targeting a specific resource, with an
associated attack zone of size z and a single replica, after
obtaining k different random IDs. However, in most DHTs
the resources are typically stored in r > 1 nodes. In this case
the attacker needs to obtain r node-IDs, instead of just one,
within the attack zone. As the generation of each node-ID is
an independent event, the probability of getting at least r IDs
within the attack zone after k attempts is then:
Presource(z, k, r) =
(
1−
(
1−
z
M
)k)r
(2)
Therefore, the probability of success on attacking a partic-
ular resource grows exponentially with the number of replicas
(r). It is also worth mentioning that the previous expressions
are also valid for Sybil resource attacks targeting other DHT
systems like Kademlia/KAD, as we will see later.
III. MODELLING THE EXPECTED VULNERABILITY TO
SYBIL RESOURCE ATTACKS OF A DHT SYSTEM
The previous section has described the model to calculate
the probability of success of a Sybil attack targeting a par-
ticular resource with an attack zone of a specific size. This
analysis may be interesting for the owner of the resource in
order to check its vulnerability to Sybil attacks. However,
when the resource’s attack zone changes due to churn (i.e.
nodes joining/leaving the DHT), or from the point of view
of the global DHT system, the analysis for a particular attack
zone is not enough. In this section we compute the probability
of success of a Sybil attack targeting some random resource
of the DHT. We refer to this metric as Psys. This captures the
expected vulnerability to Sybil resource attacks of the overall
DHT system under study, and thus irrespectively of churn.
Therefore, it is also a valuable metric for designing defences
against Sybil resource attacks.
Toward this end, we first model the distribution of the size
of the attack zones in a Chord DHT. Let us first consider the
case of a single replica. In this case, if a random resource key
is selected, we would like to estimate the probability that at
least one successor is present in a certain attack zone with
size X ∈ [0,M), where X is a random variable representing
the attack zone size (AZS). This probability is, by definition,
equal to 1− probability of having no successors in X (that is,
all nodes are outside X), and therefore it is cdfAZS(x, n). Its
formal expression, where n is the number of DHT nodes, is:
cdfAZS(x, n) = P (x < X) = 1−
(
1−
x
M
)n
(3)
Now we can easily derive the pmfAZS(x, n) of the random
variable X , that is, the distribution of the attack zone size in
a Chord DHT with n nodes:
pmfAZS(x, n) =
∂
∂x
cdfAZS(x, n) =
n
M
(
1−
x
M
)n−1
(4)
Note that this expression is also valid to model the dis-
tribution of the size of the attack zone for other DHTs
such as Kademlia [3]. In Kademlia the nodes storing the
resource are the ones with the closest ID to the resource’s key
(independently if such node is a successor or a predecessor of
the key). Then the size of the attack zone is defined as two
times the number of IDs between the resource key and the
closest node-ID, so that the expression in Eq. 4 is also valid.
On the one hand, from Eq. 4 we know the probability of an
attack zone of size x happening in a Chord ring with n nodes.
On the other hand, Eq. 1 tell us the probability of success of a
Sybil resource attack for a given attack zone size. Therefore, in
order to obtain the desired metric, we simply have to perform
the following integration2 process:
Psys(n, k) =
∫ M
0
Presource(x, k) · pmfAZS(x, n) dx =
=
n
M
∫ M
0
(
1−
x
M
)n−1
−
(
1−
x
M
)k+n−1
dx = 1−
n
n + k
(5)
Note that Eq. 5 does not depend on the ID-space size M ,
but just on n, the total number of nodes in the DHT, and k,
the number of node-IDs obtained by the attacker.
For the case of multiple replicas, we simply need to consider
that each success process (i.e. obtaining a node-ID within the
attack zone) is an independent event. Then Psys(n, k, r) =
Psys(n, k)
r
. This leads to the following expression for the
probability of success of attacking a random resource in a
DHT system where r nodes store each resource:
Psys(n, k, r) =
(
1−
n
n + k
)r
=
(
k
k + n
)r
(6)
2For big values of M , as is the case of most DHT systems (e.g. in RELOAD
M = 2128), the discrete ID-space [0, M) can be considered a continuous one.
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Fig. 1: Probability mass function of the attack zone size (AZS)
in Chord and Kademlia (M=1038, n=105).
The above formula also allows us to know the number of
sybils required to attack a DHT system with a given size and
number of replicas, for a certain probability p ≡ Psys:
k = p1/r(k + n) =
np1/r
1− p1/r
=
n
p−1/r − 1
(7)
This success probability may be also seen as the portion of
all resources fully controlled by an attacker with k sybils.
Finally, we would like to highlight two important issues.
First, the final expressions derived above are also valid
for Kademlia-based DHTs, since both Presource(z, k) and
pmfAZS(x, n) are also valid for Kademlia. Second, previ-
ous works [9]–[11] have also tried to estimate the value of
Psys(n, k, r). However, they assumed that the attack zone of
all resources can be approximated by the average attack zone
size, M/n. The next section discusses the consequences of
this assumption.
IV. MODEL VALIDATION
In this section we evaluate the accuracy of our model. In
particular, we validate the distribution of the attack zone size
presented in Eq. 4, and the main metric of our model, Psys,
defined by Eqs. 6 and 7. Note that the validation of the model
for Psys implicitly validates Presource. Hence, due to space
constrains we only present the results of the former.
Toward this end we have performed exhaustive simulations3
in which we create a DHT with n=105 nodes randomly
distributed in a M=1038 ID-space (emulating RELOAD’s
[0, 2128) ID-space) and then reproduce Sybil resource attacks
against 105 resources with randomly generated keys. Each
simulation experiment was repeated 5 times in order to obtain
the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
In order to validate the distribution of the attack zone size
(AZS) in Chord and Kademlia DHTs, for each resource we
first compute the size of its attack zone, both as the distance
from the resource’s key to its successor node-ID (Chord), and
as two times the distance to the closest node-ID (Kademlia).
Fig. 1 presents the distribution of the size of the attack zones
3The source code of the developed simulator can be downloaded from
http://www.it.uc3m.es/muruenya/SybilResourceAttackSimulator.tgz
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Fig. 2: Sybil resource attack attempts vs. Probability of success
(M=1038, n=105).
from the analytical model and the simulation experiments.
We observe that the distribution of the attack zone size in
Chord and Kademlia is exactly the same, and that our model
accurately matches the simulation results.
Fig. 1 also depicts the average size (M/n=1033) of the
attack zones. Previous works [9]–[11] have assumed that the
size of the attack zone for all resources is equal to this value.
However, our model and simulations demonstrate that attack
zones smaller than the average are likely to occur. Hence,
since smaller zones are much harder to attack, our results
suggest that previous works are overestimating the probability
of success of the Sybil attack, because they only consider the
average attack zone size, instead of the real AZS distribution
as ours.
For the validation of Psys(n, k, r) we use the same setup
(M=1038, n=105), but now we simulate one Sybil attack
against each of the R=105 resources in the DHT. For each
resource we generate as many random IDs as needed (up to
a maximum of kmax = 106 attempts) until succeeding in
the attack, which means obtaining r (the number of replicas)
IDs within the attack zone. For each Sybil resource attack
we compute the number of attempts needed to succeed using
different values of r ∈ [1, 10].
Fig. 2 shows the analytical and the simulation-based cumu-
lative distributions of Psys(n, k, r) with r = 1, 2, 5 and 10.
The results demonstrate that our model is extremely accurate
since simulation values overlap the curves of the model.
Furthermore, Fig. 2 also presents the distribution in case of
assuming that all attack zones are equal to the average attack
zone size (as assumed by previous works [9]–[11]) for the
same cases of r = 1, 2, 5 and 10, which are labeled as
“Geom” in the figure. This confirms our previous hypoth-
esis, since this approximation clearly leads to overestimate
the probability of success of Sybil attacks, and the error
becomes even bigger with more replicas. This effect can be
better seen in Figure 3, which shows how the number of
replicas affects the number of sybils needed to succeed with
a given probability (p=0.1) for both our model (Eq. 7) and
previous works based on a geometric distribution, that is,
p = (1 − (1 − 1/n)k)r ⇒ k = log(1 − p1/r)/log(1 − 1/n).
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Fig. 3: Sybil resource attack attempts vs. Number of replicas
for a target success probability of p = 0.1 (n = 105).
The suitability of replication as a defense mechanism against
the Sybil resource attack may have been underestimated by
previous works, since each new replica increases the number
of attack attempts linearly, much more than previously thought.
Moreover, the approximation error made by previous works
may lead DHT system designers to overreact, and devise
additional defenses against the (overestimated) Sybil attack
that are too demanding for innocent users, as explained in
next section.
V. VULNERABILITY OF DHT SYSTEMS TO SYBIL
RESOURCE ATTACKS
The goal of this section is to briefly discuss the vulnerability
level of existing DHT systems to the Sybil resource attack.
Some of the most popular DHT systems like KAD, the one
employed by the eMule file-sharing network, or the two
main DHTs associated to BitTorrent, account for millions of
concurrently connected users. In particular, Steiner et al. [12],
and more recently Cholez et al. [7], reported that the number
of users concurrently connected to the KAD network varies
between 3.3 and 4.5 millions. Furthermore, the minimum
number of replicas of KAD resources is r = 10.
These values, together with the Eqs. 6 and 7, allow us to
make an accurate estimation of the real vulnerability of DHT
systems. In order to perform a Sybil resource attack on a
RELOAD/Chord DHT with a similar size to KAD (n = 4·106
and r = 10), an attacker would need to generate 55.7 million
IDs to guarantee a success probability of 50%. The way to
generate or gather such amount of node-IDs greatly varies
between different DHT systems and proposals [8], ranging
from changing the local port number, to leaving and joining
the network, generating a new public/private key pair, or
solving crypto-puzzles. Thus the number of resources or the
required time to perform a Sybil attack depends on the specific
mechanism to obtain node-IDs.
For instance, we can start considering a random ID gen-
eration/assignment process as simple as the one originally
proposed for Chord [1], in which the node-ID is the result of
a hash operation on the node IP address and port. In this case,
given that each IP address can be associated with up to 65536
different ports, an attacker should have access to 851 different
IP addresses. Other solutions proposed in the literature [8] to
mitigate Sybil attacks, other than a centralized authentication
server like in RELOAD [2], include using crypto-puzzles [11],
or charging a small fee to each new user [13]. The appropriate
cost of these mechanisms for legitimate users could be tuned
for that particular DHT system by means of our model. For
instance, by charging 10 cents (instead of 20 dollars, as
proposed in [13]) per random ID to new KAD users, an
attacker willing to spend 1 million dollars would only have
a 3.5% probability to completely block a resource replicated
in 10 nodes. On the other hand, if each node-ID requires
generating a new RSA key pair or solving a crypto-puzzle
that takes one second on average, 90% of all DHT resources
can be targeted after almost 12 years of computing power, or
just half a year with a cluster of 24 machines.
In short our results suggest that performing a Sybil resource
attack on RELOAD/Chord systems, or existing DHT systems
such as the KAD network (assuming secure routing and
random IDs) is more difficult than previously reported, but still
doable for resourceful attackers, using for instance a botnet or
a cluster. Finally it is worth noting that our model can be
used in order to quantify the level of security added by the
different solutions proposed against Sybil attacks and compare
their performance in an objective manner.
In a future work we will analyze partial Sybil resource
attacks where the attacker only controls a subset of all replicas.
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